Third party risk in lending
How end use of a consumer loan impacts the credit risk

Many lenders extend loans to consumers for specific uses – auto, property, education, etc. – and often in partnership with sellers and service providers. How does the performance of these partners impact the credit risk and repayment of such loans?
I recently read about a major Indian ed-tech firm’s local lending partners pulling back on providing loans to their customers for purchasing their educational products. These are big ticket loans provided to a captive customer base for a product that most Indian families hold in high esteem. So, seems like a low-risk, high-demand loan product for the lenders. Then, why are the lenders moving away from this partnership? While we do not know the terms of their partnership agreement and how palatable it is for the lenders, but could it also relate to the negative sentiment developing around the ed-tech major’s sales practices and could that, perhaps, impact the willingness of some of the borrowers to repay the loan?
The delivery performance of the seller-partners has an impact on the repayment risk of the loans in such situation. This has been seen in other industries as well, such as housing. Many borrowers in China stopped repaying their home loans when the construction of their apartments stalled last year and the same has been repeated in many other countries and industries. What are some of the ways in which lenders can mitigate these risks?
Ideally, lenders should have a default-guarantee clause in their agreements with the seller partners, whereby some of the default is absorbed by the partners. This can be structured in many different ways – such as, first X% of default or any default beyond Y% – depending on mutual agreement and the economics of lending. Second, where possible, the lenders should avoid making lumpsum payments for products that are not fully delivered and should tie the disbursement to the delivery schedule.
It is also important that the lenders keep a close tab on the performance of their seller partners. While an objective credit risk assessment of the borrowers is imperative, the willingness to repay will be impacted by the perceived satisfaction of the borrowers to some extent. And if the borrowers feel cheated, pressured or misled, they may decide to stop repayments in protest, especially if the loans were fronted by the sellers and the borrowers do not fully realize that they are indebted to a third party. So, another thing to consider would be to be more visible in loan sourcing and ensuring that the borrowers understand who they are contracting with and what their obligations are.
The lenders may or may not have the leverage to force their seller partners to change tack, but they would do well to limit their exposure if there are concerns about delivery or reputation of the sellers. In the case of the ed-tech major, it seems that they are forced to lend from their own balance sheet to maintain their enrollment numbers and that has had an impact on their liquidity and financial performance.
What are some other methods that you have employed or seen in practice in such lending agreements?


